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Communication and the Pragmatic Condition
Gregory J. Shepherd
"We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with
certain unalienable rights, that among these are life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness." -Jefferson
There was not in July of 1776, as there is not now,
anything "self-evident" about these truths-not

if by self-evident

we mean something like unarguably the case. This summer I
visited Monticello and a walk down Mulberry Row there-site
slave manufacturing on the beautiful grounds-is

of

evidence

enough that, to Jefferson himself, there was nothing unarguable
about the truth of equality. No, this self-evident truth of equality
is an argumentative assertion in support of independence. It is an
assertion of freedom. And this, the assertion of freedom, is, in
essence, the American project. "We" hold this to be our selfevident truth. Not everyone does, but we do.
It is tempting to take this assertion of independence
literally, and come to believe that we desire to be a nation of
people who don't need other people. Indeed, this ultra-libertarian
reading seems to be on the rise in present-day America. But the
great irony of democracy is that freedom requires social support;
1

The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Vol. XIX No.1

there can be no "me" without ''us.'' The second line of Jefferson's
Declaration of Independence-the
that we all know so well -is

one I opened my remarks with

heady, but the last line of the

declaration, much less known, is its musculature: "and for the
support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection
of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives,
our fortunes and our sacred honor." The 56 men who asserted
their independence in Philadelphia knew that their individual
freedom depended upon one another. It was Benjamin Franklin,
one of the signers, who characteristically captured the
interdependence of these independence-seeking men: ''we must
hang together or assuredly we shall hang separately."
This is the great irony of freedom and the problem that
pragmatic philosophy was born to reconcile. Freedom requires
cooperation (and there can be no cooperation that is coerced). It
is, of course, no accident that pragmatism is the American
philosophy-that
fitfulness-and

it was born here, that it expresses us, in all our
that reconciling the irony of freedom required the

idea of communication and its elevation as America's idol.
So walk with me today on pragmatism's path. It is a road
that feels meandering, but runs in a definite direction. It is one we
build together in order to form a more perfect union, a union of
individuals. We'll begin the walk with a bit of talk about
democracy in America, trying to catch a glimpse or two of the
2
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need it produced for a new philosophy. We'll then spend a bit of
time with that American philosophy, pragmatism, and see in turn
its need for the miracle of communication as the reconciler of
democracy's dilemma. We will, finally, wind up with some
words about what all this might mean for us as academics. What
might all of this say to us about our teaching, research and
service?

Democracy in America
Alexis de Tocqueville came to study democracy in
America in 1831 and published his famous observations between
1835 and 1840. Here is how he introduced his work:
"Amongst the novel objects that attracted my attention
during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me
more forcibly than the general equality of condition
among the people. I readily discovered the prodigious
influence which this primary fact exercises on the whole
course of society; it gives a peculiar direction to public
opinion, and a particular tenor to the laws; it imparts new
maxims to the governing authorities, and peculiar habits
to the governed.
I soon perceived that the influence of this fact extends far
beyond the political character and the laws of the county,
and that it has no less empire over civil society than over
the government; it creates opinions, engenders sentiments,
founds novel customs, and modifies whatever it does not
produce. The more I advanced in the study of American
society, the more I perceived that the equality of
conditions is the fundamental fact from which all others
seem to be derived, and the central point at which all my
3
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observations constantly terminated." (Tocqueville, 2001,

p.26)
Now, what did he mean by "equality of conditions?"
Certainly not that people were equally rich in material
circumstance. Not then and not now. No, rather he meant
something more-he

meant what Jefferson meant when he wrote

that we Americans hold the truth of our equality to be selfevident, and how that permeates everything about us.
In 1899 William James published a collection of essays
under the title "Talks to Teachers" and it contains two of my
favorites of his, one called "On A Certain Blindness in Human
Beings" and the other "What Makes a Life Significant."
Together they provide insight into Tocqueville's observation
about the fundamental fact of equality in America. James
concludes "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings" this way:
"And now what is the result of all these considerations
and quotations? It is negative in one sense, but positive in
another. It absolutely forbids us to be forward in
pronouncing on the meaninglessness of forms of
existence other than our own; and it commands us to
tolerate, respect, and indulge those whom we see
harmlessly interested and happy in their own ways,
however unintelligible these may be to us. Hands off:
neither the whole of truth nor the whole of good is
revealed to any single observer, although each observer
gains a partial superiority of insight from the peculiar
position in which he stands." (McDermott, 1977, pp. 644645)
4
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He continues in his opening remarks on ''what makes a
life significant":
"In my previous talk, "On a Certain Blindness," I tried to
make you feel how soaden and shot-through life is with
values and meanings which we fail to realize because of
our external and insensible point of view. The meanings
are there for the others, but they are not there for us.
There lies more than a mere interest of curious
speculation in understanding this. It has the most
tremendous practical importance. I wish that I could
convince you of it as I feel it myself. It is the basis of all
our tolerance, social, religious, and political. The
forgetting of it lies at the root of every stupid and
sanguinary mistake that rulers over subject-peoples make.
The first thing to learn in intercourse with others is noninterference with their own peculiar ways of being happy,
provided those ways do not assume to interfere by
violence with ours. No one has insight into all the ideals.
No one should presume to judge them off-hand. The
pretension to dogmatize about them in each other is the
root of most human injustices and cruelties and the trait in
human character most likely to make the angels weep."
~cDermott, 1977,p.645)
This recognition, however unarticulated, is what
Tocqueville saw being lived out in most every comer of
American life. The equality that arises with the faith that none of
us has all of the truth or all of the good is what distinguishes us.
No king or queen has more of it than do you and I; no priest or
shaman. And this fact about the democratic character of truth is
also; as we will see, what makes communication primary in
democratic life.
5
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So, Tocqueville comes to realize that this fundamental
fact of equality influences the entire course of American society.
One such course is an especially good example of both the
ranging and lasting influence of equality on American society,
and of the resulting need for a philosophy peculiar to America.
Chapter 10 of the first volume of Democracy in America is titled:
"Why the Americans are More Addicted to Practical than to
Theoretical Science." He introduces the chapter, writing:
"Equality begets in man the desire of judging of everything for
himself: it gives him, in all things, a taste for the tangible and the
real, a contempt for tradition and for forms." (Tocqueville, 2001,
p. 163)
Let's take these one by one.
(1) Equality begets the desire to judge everything for
ourselves. One hundred eighty years ago, Tocqueville
was struck by how little Americans granted authorities,
"Who are you to say?!"-how

unimpressed they were by

credentials, and how willing they were to argue and point
out weaknesses in the opinions of others. You see, no one
has more truth or good than anyone else.
(2) Equality gives us a taste for the tangible and the real.
Tocqueville argued that self-reliance requires leading
rather constantly active lives-who

has time for nonsense

(stuff that doesn't matter)? Time is a wasting.
6
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Tocqueville said, "Men who live in democratic
communities not only seldom engage in meditation, but
they naturally entertain very little esteem for it. ... And
the habits of mind which are suited to an active life, are
not always suited to a contemplative one." The cost and
reward of faith in equality, of embrace of independence,
is mobility. We could be elsewhere, doing otherwise,
living life even more fully, experiencing even greater
freedom, pursuing even more happiness. What tangible
things will help us in these regards?
(3) Equality provides us with contempt for tradition and for
forms. Of all the cultural criticisms of America over the
years, this is perhaps most common, and the one of
which many Americans are most proud. Age or longevity
is not, in and of itself, much valued. We have relatively
few enduring cultural traditions. If something better
comes along, we throw out the old. We dislike and
distrust systems of all sorts, holding little faith in
institutions. We don't much cotton to the jargon they
engender. Heck, Tocqueville wrote way back when that
we didn't like "big words." (Tocqueville, 2001, p. 163)

Can you begin to see the need for a different kind of
philosophy to capture this democratic way oflife?
7
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Pragmatism
How, in a nutshell, to summarize the American
philosophy? I think by concentrating our attention on three
interrelated points.
First, if, as Tocqueville noted, the "fundamental fact" of
American life, the one that influences every comer of our society,
is the equality of our conditions-the

fact that none of us

possesses all of the truth, that we each have our share-what

does

that tell us about truth itself?
Pragmatism is, first and foremost, a theory of truth that
breaks radically from the long dominant, Old World,
deterministic, absolutist, positivistic one. Pragmatism asserts that
truth is made, not found. It is, after all, America's philosophy.
Truth is under constant construction. It is a social product, one
that, as James says, is verbally built out. Louis Menand, in his
Pulitzer Prize-winning book, The Metaphysical Club, writes
about Charles Sanders Peirce, the brilliant and mercurial man
who first coined the term pragmatism, "in a universe in which
events are uncertain and perception is fallible, knowing cannot be
a matter of an individual mind 'mirroring' reality. Each mind
reflects differently--even
different moments-and

the same mind reflects differently at
in any case, reality doesn't stand still

long enough to be accurately mirrored. Peirce's conclusion was
that knowledge must, therefore, be social. It was his most
8
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important contribution to American thought, and when he
recalled late in life, how he came to forward it, he described itfittingly-as

the product of a group. This was the conversation

society he formed with William James, Oliver Wendall Holmes,
Jr., and a few others in Cambridge in 1872, the group known as
'The Metaphysical Club.' (Menand, 2001, p. 200)
Truth is socially constructed. Can you see how that
philosophical conclusion fits with a society that asserts equality,
freedom, to be self-evident? And the implications that then holds
for how we live our lives? Why would traditions be much valued
if truth is under constant construction? It's not like anything we
know is forevermore. And why would we much value authority,
or credentials, when truth isn't something discovered by a few,
but made by all? And in a society that values the tangible over
the meditative, is it a surprise that our philosophy defined truth as
what it is best to believe? That was James' definition: Truth is
what is best to believe. As Menand put it, "If behaving as though
we had free will or God exists gets us results we want, we will
not only come to believe those things; they will be,
pragmatically, true." (McDermott, 1977, p. 355)
In sum, pragmatism, James said, talks "about truths in the
plural, about their utility and satisfactoriness, about the success
with which they 'work'." (McDermott, 1977, p. 385) How very
American.
9
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Second, William James famously asserted the will to
believe. Free will is an essential character of American
pragmatism. James said that '''Will you or won't you have it so?'
is the most probing question we are ever asked; we are asked it
every hour of the day, and about the largest as well as the
smallest, the most theoretical as well as the most practical
things." (McDermott, 1977, p. 716)
We all know well the experience of hearing the alarm go
off in the morning, hitting the snooze or off button, and lying in
bed seemingly unable to get up. We know the feeling of telling
ourselves, "OK, 1 have to get up now," but feeling unable to do
so. But, finally, we know the feeling of willing ourselves out of
bed. Of forcing ourselves. Of saying "I will have it so." Oomph.
That is the exertion of free will. So is the avoidance of
temptations, of all sorts, when we will ourselves to say no, or
walk away. We sometimes fail. The will is not fixed, you see.
And, as James noted, if it is not fixed, it must be free. We exert
more or less of it, saying "I will have it so," or not. And what is
true of our behaviors is also true of our beliefs: We can will
ourselves to believe. As Americans we are, importantly, called to
believe that we are all created equal. Pragmatism wants people to
understand that their wills are free and that leading significant
and good lives requires the strenuous exercise ofthose wills.

10
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This pragmatic assertion of free will is another expression
of the American condition. We are a nation, not only of doers,
but also of believers. As James said, "When we give up the
doctrine of objective certitude, we do not thereby give up the
quest or hope of truth itself." (McDermott, 1977, p. 726) In fact,
we are a nation not only of doers, and believers, but of searchers
as well. James wrote of two commandments, believe truth and
shun error. They are "two materially different laws; and by
choosing between them we may end by coloring differently our
whole intellectual life. We may regard the chase for truth as
paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary; or we may,
on the other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more imperative
and let truth take its chance." (McDermott, 1977, p. 727)
James, of course, wants us to choose truth because to
choose otherwise is to be the kind of person American
pragmatists tend to most dislike: a skeptic. James summed it up
nicely: "Skepticism is not avoidance of option; it is option of a
particular kind of risk. Better risk loss of truth than chance of
error." (McDermott, 1977, p. 732) And isn't one of the negative
stereotypes we collectively hold toward Europeans, especially
elite ones, that they are skeptical about everything?
The third and final point about pragmatism I want us to
concentrate on is its character as what James called a "melioristic
doctrine." Pragmatism is neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but
11
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melioristic. It is concerned with ''the possible," with recognizing
what might be, and taking action to enact it. The universe isn't
fixed; it is malleable to human thinking and effort. This is, in
part, the power of the idea of free will: James argued that "freewill is a general cosmological theory of promise" (McDermott,
1977,p.403)
OK, so what does it mean to say something is possible?
Here's James' answer: "It means not only that there are no
preventative conditions present, but that some of the conditions
of production of the possible thing actually are here."
(McDermott, 1977, p. 466) The pragmatic life, the democratic
life, the American life, then, consists largely of identifying
conditions that already exist in order to exert will to enact
certain possibilities. That bears repeating, because it is as good
and concise a summary of the pragmatic sensibilty as I am likely
to offer: The pragmatic life, the democratic life, the American
life, then consists largely of identifying conditions that already
exist in order to exert will to enact certain possibilities.
Pragmatism is rightly associated with progressivism, with
action, change, and, most commonly, with experimentation. Try
something; if it doesn't work, try something else. Consider
something, and if it doesn't work, consider something else.
Which reminds me of a Nick Lowe lyric: "If you ever get to
thinking I don't love you, think again."
12
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Also, realize how this fits with a constructivist conception
of truth. If truth is made, not found, then we are responsible for
exerting our wills on the side of making good truths, better and
better ones. Finally, it should be clear why pragmatism elevates
communication to the status of miracle worker: In Dewey's
famous characterization, communication is a miracle by the side
of which transubstantiation pales.
If truth is socially constructed, then communication must
be what makes it. In a world where everyone has his own corner
of truth, her own will to freely exert, communication must be
what makes communal activity possible. And remember that our
equality extends not only over what is known, but what is good.
James wrote, "There can be no fmal truth in ethics, any more than
in physics, until the last man has had his experience and said his
say." (McDermott, 1977, p. 611) See how this is the philosophy
for the democratic way of life, where we are all free and equal.
Again, James writes, "The absolutist calls upon the phenomenal
world to be, and it is, exactly as he calls for it, no other condition
being required. In our world, the wishes of the individual are only
one condition. Other individuals are there with other wishes and
they must be propitiated first. So Being grows under all sorts of
resistances in this world of the many, and, from compromise to
compromise, only gets organized gradually." (McDermott, 1977,
p. 468) And we are now back to democracy's dilemma:
13
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Weare individuals, each free. But our freedom depends
upon reconciling ourselves with others. And, that requires
communication.

Implications for Us, as Academics
I want to spend the remainder of my time with you talking
about what all of this might mean for us as teachers, scholars, and
folks with an obligation to serve our communities. What are
some of the implications of a philosophy that treats truth as a
social construction, wills as free, a different universe as possible,
and communication as key to it all? First, to our teaching.

Teaching
My mother, Amanda, was a teacher. Her sister, Gladys,
was a teacher, as was Gladys' husband, Walter. My mom's
brother, Arnold, was a teacher. So was his wife, Ada. Arnold and
Ada's daughter, Jane, is a teacher. My mom's brother, Elmer,
was ... a farmer. But he and his wife, Glenda's, daughter,
Margaret, was a teacher, and her husband, Roy, is too. If you
shake the Kittleson family tree, teachers rain down. I share this
with you for a couple of reasons. First, I thought you'd enjoy
hearing all those Americanized Norwegian names: Gladys and
Glenda, Elmer, Arnold, and Ada, Amanda. Second, I want you to
know that, no matter what else, I think of myself first and always
14
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as a schoolteacher, and I hope all the facility here, and those
aspiring to be, do too. It is too easy to forget the first reason why
we are here.
So what does all this talk of pragmatism and
communication mean for us as teachers? A very great deal, but
there is one most important lesson, and that is the melioristic
nature of the universe and the place of our free will therein.
Wittgenstein opens Part II of Philosophical Investigations with a
question: "Can only those hope who can talk?" And he
immediately responds in the affIrmative: "Only those who have
mastered the use oflanguage."

(Wittgenstein, 2009, p. i)

Wittgenstein's point here is a pragmatic one: Communication is
what allows for the creation of new and better truths. That is what
lends us hope. Nothing is fixed, and that fact allows for the hope
of creating something better. Gadamer wrote similarly:
"Language is not its elaborated conventionalism, nor the burden
of pre-schematization with which it loads us, but the generative
and creative power to unceasingly make this whole once again
fluent." (Gadamer, 1991, p. 549)
Pragmatic teaching aims toward communicating this
power-the

power to unceasingly make this whole once again

fluent. Nothing is more important. Imagine the opposite. Imagine
preaching to students a doctrine of determinism, that whoever
they are born being is who they will forever be. Or fatalism, that
15
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all is beyond their control, so there's no use fighting it. No, the
single most important thing we can teach our students is that the
power to make and remake all is possible because truth is under
constant construction, their wills are free to be exerted in building
what is true, and communication allows for the possibility of
what James called the building of a perfected pluralistic pattern.
Concretely this means a few things, at least. First, we
should take as a primary responsibility the challenge of helping
students to become stronger and stronger at recognizing the
conditions that exist for the creation of better and better
possibilities. This is what we are called to do as teachers. It isn't
about teaching found truths, but ever growing pluralistic ones.
And this means there is an always-present moral dimension to
our teaching. We must understand that in a universe where truth
is pluralistically constructed, we have a moral obligation to help
build good truths. Do not ever forget the moral responsibility of
teaching. Truth is not neutral. With your students, make good
ones. Never be afraid to talk with students about what is good to
believe and right to do.
Second, do all you can to fight the instructional ideology,
still dominant in many quarters, that educated men and women
are skeptics; that teaching young people to be skeptical is the first
goal of education. Telling students that their primary allegiance is
to the "shun error" commandment, rather than to the "seek truth"
16
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one will color not only their whole intellectual life, as James
claimed, but their whole social one as well. Our democracy
requires doers, believers, and searchers, not lumps, cynics, and
sleepers.
Third, determinism, fatalism, skepticism, and that family
of anti-pragmatic anthropologies tempt people who fear
responsibility. Help your students embrace responsibility. One
way to do this is to help them get over the fear of decisionmaking. Most of us worry far too much about decisions we have
to make, and far too little about realizing the possibilities that
accrue as the result of whatever those decisions are. Life isn't
about choices; it's about what we do with the conditions that
arise from the choices we make. If a student is struggling over the
choice of a major, help her to understand that she cannot know
which is best. She can only know that a certain set of conditions
will be present for the realization of a certain set of possibilities if
she chooses Major A, and a different set of conditions will be
present for the realization of a different set of possibilities if she
chooses Major B. And, for certain, some of those possibilities
arising from either choice might be good, and some might be bad.
What matters is her ability to create the good ones. And what is
true of majors is going to be true of all the decisions she will face
in life. Teach her to be pragmatic in her decision-making outlook,

17
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and you will also give her what she will need to be decisive and
happy about it.
In short, when it comes to our teaching, pragmatism tells
us to make good truths with our students; not to let them be
skeptics; and to give them practice identifying already existing
conditions for the creation of new possibilities. And what does
this American philosophy advise with regard to our research
mission?

Research
When I was a 17-year-old freshman at the University of
Minnesota, I did a typically unthinking and boneheaded thing: I
enrolled in a huge lecture class, probably 500-plus students, in
physics and astronomy. I did this even though I'd never been in a
classroom with more than 30 students and I had almost no
science background from my mediocre public school education
(made especially mediocre, no doubt, by the time I spent smoking
cigarettes in the parking lot as opposed to studying or attending
class). The physics and astronomy course was taught by a famous
professor at the university, a man by the name of Karlis
Kaufmanis. Professor Kaufmanis was a tiny East European man,
with a shock of white hair and a very foreign accent. He was
every bit a professor. He was also a marvelous lecturer, with eyes

18
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that twinkled and an obvious love for both his subject matter and
his students.
On the day he lectured on Einstein's theory of relativity,
where he gave some attention, of course, to "curved space," I
summoned the courage to make my way to the front of the
auditorium to address the great Professor Kaufmanis. I waited my
turn in line as he shuffled his papers, talked with students, and
prepared to leave the auditorium. I [mally got the chance to speak
to him and said, "Professor Kaufmanis, I know space is curved,
but I haven't a clue what that means. I mean, what does it mean
to say that? To say that space is curved?" He looked up at me
with those twinkly professorial eyes and said, ''No one knows for
sure, but isn't it wonderful?" That was the day, I think, that I
understood what it meant to love ideas. The unknown is full of
wonder. It may also have been the day that a latent thought was
planted in my late adolescent brain: I might like to be a professor.
Wonder. The great economist E.F. Schumacher wrote
this: "It is wonder-not

mere curiosity, one of the lower virtues

common also to cats, but wonder, a sense of enchantment, of
respect for the mysteries, of love for the other-that

is essential

to the information and techniques and knowing that seeks insight
and understanding." (Cited in Smith, 1991, p. 99) Enchantment,
respect for mysteries, love of other. We toss around the word
''wonderful'' as if it carried no weight, but it does. To say, for
19
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example, that someone is wonderful is to say something very
significant: Such people are full of enchantment, have a deep
down respect for the unknown, and an abundance of love, not for
self, but for others.
The first thing I want to say about our research, then, is
that we professors should be full of wonder, and much of our
lives should be devoted to the search, not for truths that
pragmatism teaches are nowhere to be found, but for
wonderments that we might imagine and create. Any of you who
have read James' "Varieties of Religious Experience" know that
he was a man of wonder, in search of wonderments.
Pragmatists-James

in particular-were

always riled by those

who confused their philosophy with mere practicalism, or base
utilitarianism. James, for example, always argued that
metaphysical beliefs are the most pragmatic of beliefs because
they influence how we live our lives. Does God exist? Is space
curved? I have, in a practical sense, never much "used" Professor
Kaufmanis' class. I was no physicist in the making, and I've
never used the stars to navigate my walks around the
neighborhood, but, after taking his class, I never experienced the
universe in the same way. The sky looks different to me now than
it did when I was 17. Life feels different. How could it not?
Space, darn it all, is curved. Isn't that wonderful?

20

The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Vol. XIX No.1

Rorty wrote about this as the democratic demand to ever-expand
our defInition of ''us.'' Who we consider to be one of us is a
building project (since there is, of course, no objective defInition
of belonging to the democratic tribe). After the horrible shootings
in Tucson earlier this year, David Brooks penned a very
pragmatic essay in the New York Times in which he argues that
our civility rests upon the humility that comes with what I am
arguing is the distinctly American sense that none of us possesses
all of the truth or all of the good. If we want to serve our
communities, we would, in turn, be well-served to remember our
modesty. Let's go out and work with others to realize better
possibilities, knowing, as James knew, that:
"We can create the conclusion, then. We can and we may,
as it were, jump with both feet off the ground into or
towards a world of which we trust the other parts to meet
our jump-and only so can the making of a perfected
world of the pluralistic pattern ever take place."
~cDermott, 1977,p. 740)
When I "serve" on a graduate student's committee, or a
departmental or college one, I need to be mindful of what I do not
know, and see my part as one player in the orchestra that is that
committee. Western Michigan University will not realize its
possibilities without you leaping in to help create its pluralistic
pattern. Without you, some piece of the truth will always be
missing. Be humble, and you will be civil; but be quiet, and you
will disappear. Remember, our equality means that each of us has
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experience, and 1mean "common" in multiple senses -that

it is

unaffected, or unadorned, and rather usual, or familiar, as well as
being joint, or shared, but, for all of that commonness, no less
miraculous. Dewey wrote of the "satisfaction that comes from a
sense of union with others, a feeling capable of being intensified
till it becomes a mystical sense of fusion with others"-the
satisfaction, we might say, that comes with what 1 want to call
"service."
1 know Professors Autumn and Chad Edwards, together
with their students, have been researching the satisfaction people
have in experiencing what they are calling "peak
communication," so let me conclude my discussion of service
with an excerpt from Keith Richards' recent autobiography; it is
eloquent and ironic, coming fr<?mthe man who so famously
penned, "I can't get no satisfaction." Here Keef articulates the
unique and democratic satisfaction of being both a free individual
and a member of a social whole, experiencing the simultaneous
experience of self and other by being a guitar player in a band.
Listen to this and imagine saying something similar about being a
member of a committee:
"You're sitting with some guys, and you're playing and
you go, "Oooh, yeah!" That feeling is worth more than
anything. There's a certain moment when you realize that
you've actually just left the planet for a bit and that
nobody can touch you. You're elevated because you're
with a bunch of guys that want to do the same thing as
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you. And when it works, baby, you've got wings. You
know you've been somewhere most people will never get;
you've been to a special place. And then you want to keep
going back and keep landing again, and when you land
you get busted. But you always want to go back there. It's
flying without a license." (Richards, 2010, p. 97)
Our task, as Americans, particularly, is to assimilate, as
Dewey said, not to a culture, but to one another; to become
players in a band as good as the Rolling Stones. If, as academics,
we began to think of our service requirement as the requirement
to assimilate to others, and to lead in helping others assimilate to
still others, building our sense of we-ness, well, then service in
the academy would be something, wouldn't it? It would be
perfectly pragmatic.
I want to thank you for the honor of this invitation and
close with something of a plea. The world is a hard place. I don't
have to point out examples, for they are everywhere. All
pragmatists share a deep sense oflife's tragic character. Lincoln
had it, so did Pierce, James and Dewey. But it is our experience
of the senselessness of so much of life that drives us to assert our
freedom to make it otherwise, to make it, in fact-and practice,
sensible. And we do this with the certainty that only together can
we make good sense of it all. Remember this as teachers,
scholars, public servants, and as disciples of communication,
because the truth of our equality, the assertion of our freedom,
depends upon it.
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